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District Judge: Honorable Jeffrey L. Schmehl 
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______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 This case involves a state-run program to reimburse 
Pennsylvania hospitals for treating indigent patients.  
Plaintiffs-Appellants are a group of hospitals and their related 
health care networks that seek civil remedies from Defendants-
Appellees, another hospital and hospital system, for violations 
of the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)–(d).  Plaintiffs allege that 
Defendants submitted fraudulent claims for reimbursement, in 
violation of the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and 
received an unduly inflated proportion of the available funding.  
As a result, Plaintiffs claim they were reimbursed an artificially 
smaller share of funds.  The District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ 
claims for lack of RICO standing, an additional requirement to 
Article III standing.  It found that Plaintiffs failed to plead 
sufficient facts to demonstrate that their injury was caused by 
Defendants’ alleged fraud. 
 Because we find Plaintiffs’ theory of liability 
adequately alleges proximate causation, we will reverse the 
District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Tobacco Settlement Act and Extraordinary 
Expense Program 
 In 1998, Pennsylvania and forty-five other states 
entered into a master settlement agreement with certain 
cigarette manufacturers.  As part of the settlement, the cigarette 
manufacturers disbursed funding to the states to cover tobacco-
related health care costs.  To allocate the funds to hospitals 
providing care to indigent patients, the Pennsylvania General 
Assembly enacted the Tobacco Settlement Act in 2001 (the 
“Act”).  P.L. 755, No. 77 (codified at 35 Pa. Stat. § 5701.101 
et seq. (2001)). 
 This case concerns the Hospital Extraordinary Expense 
Program (“EE Program”) established under the Act.  The EE 
Program reimburses participating hospitals for “extraordinary 
expenses” incurred for treating uninsured patients.1  The 
amount each participating hospital receives is the lesser of “(1) 
the extraordinary expense claim[] or (2) the prorated amount 
of each hospital’s percentage of extraordinary expense costs as 
compared to all eligible hospitals’ extraordinary expense costs, 
as applied to the total funds available in the Hospital 
Extraordinary Expense Program for the fiscal year.”  35 Pa. 
Stat. § 5701.1105(d) (2001).  The latter recognizes that funds 
available through this program may not cover all extraordinary 
expenses that would be eligible for reimbursement in a fiscal 
 
 1 As defined by the statute, “extraordinary expenses” are 
“the cost of hospital inpatient services provided to an uninsured 
patient which exceeds twice the hospital’s average cost per stay 
for all patients.”  35 Pa. Stat. § 5701.1102 (2001). 
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year.  So, in fiscal years when the program does not have 
enough money to cover all of the extraordinary expenses of 
each participating hospital, the funds are distributed 
proportionally based on each hospital’s share of reported 
extraordinary expenses. 
 The Act charges the Department of Human Services 
(formerly the Department of Public Welfare) (“DHS”) with 
administering the EE Program.  § 5701.1105(b).  This includes 
the responsibility to determine the eligibility of each hospital 
for payment under the EE Program based on certain 
requirements under the Act.  § 5701.1105(b)(4).  A 
participating hospital must submit eligibility information and 
unpaid claims through the Pennsylvania Health Care Cost 
Containment Council’s (“PHC4”) website portal on a quarterly 
basis.  DHS then calculates and makes EE Program payments 
to qualifying hospitals on an annual basis.2  § 5701.1105(b)(5). 
B. Factual Background 
 The Pennsylvania Auditor General has audited the EE 
Program for each Fiscal Year since the Program’s nascence.  
According to the Auditor General’s Reports for Fiscal Years 
2008-2012, some participating hospitals received 
disbursements for unqualified claims.  For the years in which 
 
 2 Although the Act requires DHS to pay the hospitals by 
October 1 of each fiscal year, the claims submitted were for 
services rendered a year or a year-and-a-half prior.  Therefore, 
the references throughout this Opinion to a particular “fiscal 
year” are based on the year in which disbursements are made 
to participating hospitals rather than the year in which medical 
services were rendered. 
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the total amount of extraordinary expenses claimed by 
participating hospitals under the EE Program exceeded the 
total funds available in the EE Program, the Auditor General 
recommended, inter alia, that DHS claw back funds from the 
overpaid hospitals and redistribute the money to hospitals that 
had been underpaid. 
 DHS followed the Auditor General’s recommendations 
for the fiscal years prior to Fiscal Year 2010.  But DHS later 
found methodological discrepancies between DHS’s and the 
Auditor General’s eligibility determinations.3  As a result, 
DHS decided to discontinue the claw-back process for Fiscal 
Years 2010-2012 and declined to reallocate EE Program funds 
for those years.4 
 
 
 3 As justification for its decision to discontinue the 
claw-back procedure pursuant to the Auditor General’s 
recommendations, DHS stated that “[n]either [the Tobacco 
Settlement Act nor the DHS’s approved State Plan] requires 
[DHS] to recalculate and redistribute payments as updated 
information becomes available from hospitals after [DHS] has 
made its determination. . . . [S]uch a requirement would result 
in constant revision and recalculation of payment amounts for 
indefinite periods of time, which is a result seemingly 
inconsistent with the General Assembly’s intent.”  App. 119. 
 4 The Auditor General issued reports of a particular 
fiscal year several years after that fiscal year’s disbursement.  
For example, the report of Fiscal Year 2010 was not released 
until 2014. 
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C. Procedural Background 
 Plaintiffs-Appellants are a group of hospitals and their 
related health care networks suing on behalf of all hospitals 
participating in the EE Program that the Auditor General 
deemed underpaid during Fiscal Years 2010-2012 
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”).  Plaintiffs commenced this action 
against Lancaster General Hospital (“Lancaster”), one of the 
allegedly overpaid hospitals, and its related hospital system 
and staff (collectively, “Defendants”).  Plaintiffs claim 
Defendants conspired to defraud the Tobacco Settlement Act’s 
EE Program in violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1964.  
Plaintiffs seek civil remedies under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“civil 
RICO”).  They also bring state-law claims for unjust 
enrichment and breaches of a constructive trust. 
 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that John Doe 1 and John 
Doe 2, employees of Lancaster, “knew that [Lancaster’s] 
claims were grossly inflated but nevertheless continued to 
submit them even after being called out by the Auditor 
General.”  App. 37.  They claim John Doe 1 instructed John 
Doe 2 to submit fraudulent claims through the PHC4 portal for 
Fiscal Years 2008-2012.  Plaintiffs contend that these actions 
amount to separate acts of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, 
a RICO predicate, and together the acts formed a pattern of 
racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).  According to 
Plaintiffs, these actions resulted in “massively inflated 
extraordinary expense claims,” which unjustly enriched 
Lancaster by $9 million during Fiscal Years 2010-2012.5  App. 
 
 5 Prior to DHS’s discontinuance of the claw-back 
procedure, Lancaster repaid excess funds received in Fiscal 
Years 2008-2009 as directed by DHS. 
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47.  Since participating hospitals submitted claims that totaled 
more than was available in EE Program funding for Fiscal 
Years 2010-2012, Plaintiffs claim they were collectively 
undercompensated by $9 million during those years. 
 Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending, inter alia, that the 
alleged RICO violation did not proximately cause Plaintiffs’ 
injury.6  The District Court agreed, granting Defendants’ 
motion and dismissing for lack of civil RICO standing.  Having 
dismissed the civil RICO claim, the District Court declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims.  
This appeal followed. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the RICO claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant 
of a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim.  Grier v. Klem, 
591 F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2010).  “[I]n deciding a motion to 
dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be 
 
 6 Defendants also moved to dismiss under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).  As we explain below, the District 
Court dismissed the civil RICO claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  
Accordingly, we apply the Rule 12(b)(6) standard in reviewing 
the District Court’s Order. 
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taken as true and interpreted in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn in favor of them.”  
McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009).  
To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) “motion to dismiss, a complaint 
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state 
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 We also review de novo a legal determination regarding 
standing to pursue a civil action under § 1964(c) of RICO.  
Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000). 
III. DISCUSSION 
 We begin with an explication of RICO standing 
requirements.  In light of these principles, we conclude that 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint adequately claims that their injury was 
proximately caused by Defendants’ allegedly fraudulent 
conduct.  Since the District Court dismissed the civil RICO 
claim on standing grounds alone, we will remand to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
A. Civil RICO Standing 
 Title 18 of the United States Code § 1964(c) provides 
that “any person injured in his business or property by reason 
of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor 
in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover 
threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, 
including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”  As distinct from Article 
III standing, a plaintiff bringing a civil RICO claim must 
additionally state an injury to business or property and “that a 
RICO predicate offense ‘not only was a ‘but for’ cause of 
injury, but was the proximate cause as well.’”  Hemi Grp., LLC 
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v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010) (citing Holmes v. Sec. 
Inv’r Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)); see also In 
re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class 
Action, 678 F.3d 235, 246 (3d Cir. 2012) (“In addition to 
meeting the constitutional standing requirements, ‘plaintiffs 
seeking recovery under RICO must satisfy additional standing 
criterion set forth in section 1964(c) of the statute.’” (quoting 
Maio, 221 F.3d at 482)).   
 Similar to the antitrust context, proximate causation is 
employed in civil RICO as a limiting principle intended to 
stymie a flood of litigation, reserving recovery for those who 
have been directly affected by a defendant’s wrongdoing.  See 
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (“[W]e use ‘proximate cause’ to label 
generically the judicial tools used to limit a person’s 
responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own 
acts.”).  But unlike its more generic definition at common law, 
“[o]ur precedents make clear that in the RICO context, the 
focus [of proximate causation] is on the directness of the 
relationship between the conduct and the harm” rather than 
“the concept of foreseeability.”  Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 12 
(2010). 
 The Supreme Court has also articulated three judicially 
practicable reasons for requiring directness of injury.  First, 
“indirect injuries make it difficult ‘to ascertain the amount of a 
plaintiff’s damages attributable to the violation, as distinct 
from other, independent factors.’”  In re Avandia Mktg., 804 
F.3d 633, 642 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 
269).  Second, and relatedly, indirect injuries risk double 
recovery so the “courts would have to adopt complicated rules 
apportioning damages to guard against this risk.”  Id.  Third, 
directly injured victims can be counted on and are best 
positioned to “vindicate the law as private attorneys general,” 
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so there is no need to extend civil RICO’s private right of 
action to those whose injuries are more remote.  Holmes, 503 
U.S. at 269–70. 
 To demonstrate “some direct relation between the injury 
asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,” the manipulation 
alleged must not be “purely contingent” on another event or 
action.  Id. at 269, 271.  Even though a plaintiff is not required 
to claim first-party reliance on a defendant’s purported 
misrepresentation, Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 
U.S. 639, 657–58 (2008), the cause of an injury that is “entirely 
distinct from the alleged RICO violation” may be too 
attenuated to meet the proximate causation requirement, Anza 
v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 458 (2006).  
Relatedly, a more direct victim of the purported violation or 
independent, intervening factors may also break the chain of 
causation.  See Hemi Grp., 559 U.S. at 15; Anza, 547 U.S. at 
458. 
B. Plaintiffs Meet the Proximate Causation 
Requirement for Civil RICO Standing 
 Applying these principles to the present case, we 
conclude that Plaintiffs have adequately stated that 
Defendants’ alleged misrepresentation proximately caused 
their injury. 
 At the outset, it is important to specify the purported 
conduct constituting a RICO predicate and the resulting injury.  
The Complaint shows that Plaintiffs’ theory of liability extends 
to Defendants’ submission of allegedly fraudulent claims 
between Fiscal Years 2008-2012.  Plaintiffs therefore claim 
collective injury in the form of a decreased proportion of EE 
Program funds during each of those years. 
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 Defendants contend, and the District Court similarly 
mischaracterizes, Plaintiffs’ injury as being based on DHS’s 
discontinuance of the claw-back procedure after the Auditor 
General’s Report of Fiscal Year 2010 was released in 2014.  
But this confuses Plaintiffs’ allegations of injury with 
Plaintiffs’ requested relief.  Although true that the existence of 
the claw-back procedure and the reapportionment of funds for 
Fiscal Years 2008-2009 undermines claims for relief during 
that period, the allegations pertinent to the question of 
proximate cause are those of the purported injury.  According 
to the Complaint, the injury traces back to submissions for 
Fiscal Year 2008.  Indeed, Plaintiffs’ injury appears to be based 
not on DHS’s discretionary conduct to terminate the claw-back 
program for Fiscal Years 2010 and beyond, but on Defendants’ 
allegedly fraudulent submissions for Fiscal Years 2008-2012. 
 Viewed in this light, it is clear that Plaintiffs’ allegations 
mirror those in Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Company, 
in which the Supreme Court concluded the plaintiffs had met 
the proximate causation requirement to proceed under civil 
RICO.  553 U.S. at 648, 661.  Bridge involved prospective 
buyers of tax liens sold by the Cook County, Illinois 
Treasurer’s Office at public auction.  Id. at 642.  Because the 
structure of the bidding system permitted multiple prospective 
buyers to submit the winning amount, the County decided to 
“allocate parcels ‘on a rotational basis’ in order to ensure that 
liens [were] apportioned fairly among [the bid winners].”  Id. 
at 643.  To prevent a bidder from sending agents to bid the 
winning amount on their behalf, thereby obtaining a 
disproportionate share of liens, the County adopted the 
“Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule,” which required each 
entity to submit bids only in its own name.  Id. 
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 The plaintiffs in Bridge, a group of bidders, claimed that 
they were injured when the defendants, other bidding entities, 
committed mail fraud, a RICO predicate, by “arrang[ing] for 
related firms to bid on [the defendants’] behalf and direct[ing] 
them to file false attestations that they complied with the 
Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule.”  Id. at 644.  By collusively 
submitting winning bids, the defendants were able to 
collectively acquire a greater number of liens than would have 
been granted to a single bidder acting alone.  The Bridge 
plaintiffs complained that the defendants’ fraudulent 
submissions regarding compliance with the Single, 
Simultaneous Bidder Rule and their collusion deprived the 
plaintiffs of their fair share of liens and related financial 
benefits.  Id.   
 The Supreme Court sided with the plaintiffs, concluding 
that they had adequately alleged a “direct relationship between 
the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the plaintiff’s injury to 
satisfy the proximate-cause principles” even though the 
plaintiffs had not relied first-hand on the defendants’ alleged 
mail fraud.  Id. at 657–58.   
 Plaintiffs’ theory of liability and alleged injury in the 
present case are nearly identical to that of the Bridge plaintiffs.  
Because the EE Program has a fixed pool of assets, 
Defendants’ alleged manipulation to increase their share of the 
limited funding necessarily resulted in Plaintiffs receiving a 
decreased proportion of those assets.  So, we must similarly 
conclude that Plaintiffs have adequately demonstrated 
proximate causation for purposes of civil RICO standing.   
 Moreover, Plaintiffs’ theory of proximate cause 
satisfies the Supreme Court’s three policy considerations for 
directness of injury.  See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269–70.  First, 
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despite the District Court’s conclusion that DHS was “the 
‘better situated plaintiff’ that can ‘generally be counted on to 
vindicate the law as private attorneys general,’” St. Luke’s 
Health Network, Inc. v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., No. 18-2157, 
2019 WL 4393112, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2019) (quoting 
Anza, 547 U.S. at 460), DHS would not have been injured as a 
result of Defendants’ misrepresentations.7  Because DHS 
would not suffer harm at the hands of Defendants’ alleged 
misrepresentations, it would have little incentive to investigate 
and vindicate any harms arising from any purported 
wrongdoing.8 
 Second, and relatedly, there is no concern of a double 
recovery by a better-situated plaintiff because no entity 
suffered any similar injury.9  Moreover, Plaintiffs’ purported 
 
 7 Defendants’ counsel conceded at oral argument that, 
assuming Defendants submitted inflated claims, DHS would 
suffer no harm. 
 8 To the extent that Defendants’ concern regarding 
DHS’s potential loss of federal matching grants is raised in 
their briefing for the purpose of showing DHS’s injury, this 
argument is a non-starter.  Not only does DHS suffer no present 
injury, but any such harm would be the direct result of having 
to redistribute funds.  Defendants’ misrepresentations would 
actually be too remote a source of injury.  See Anza, 547 U.S. 
at 458 (noting that where an injury is distinct from the alleged 
RICO violation, the relationship may be indirect).   
 9 The District Court’s reasoning that DHS could have 
but did not assess penalties for Defendants’ alleged fraud, 
pursuant to 35 Pa. Stat. § 5701.1108 (2001), is immaterial.  The 
wording of the statutory authority does not preclude other 
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damages are tangible and concrete, as opposed to the uncertain 
and ill-defined market-based injuries courts have typically 
rejected as supporting a direct relationship to the RICO 
violation.  See, e.g., Anza, 547 U.S. at 460 (“A RICO plaintiff 
cannot circumvent the proximate-cause requirement simply by 
claiming that the defendant’s aim was to increase market share 
at a competitor’s expense.”).   
 Third, since Plaintiffs request that Defendants remove 
the fraudulent claim amounts, recalculate the overall pool of 
claims submitted for Fiscal Years 2010-2012, and reapportion 
the EE Program funding among the participating hospitals, 
determining Plaintiffs’ damages should not be unduly 
burdensome.  See In re Avandia Mktg., 804 F.3d at 642 
(quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269) (discussing how damages 
are often difficult to ascertain when the harms are indirect 
because other, independent factors may have contributed to the 
injury).  At least on its face, damages appear to be no more 
difficult to quantify here than in other cases that this Court has 
permitted to go forward.  See, e.g., id. at 644 (finding no 
prohibitive difficulty in determining the overcharge amount for 
medications with misrepresented risks).   
 Defendants are more hesitant about the math.  As 
indication of the confusion that lies ahead, they list the onerous 
 
parties from seeking vindication of their rights.  See Phoenix 
Bond & Indem. Co. v. Bridge, 477 F.3d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 
2007) (“If a government’s ability to penalize fraud knocked out 
private [RICO] litigation, then § 1964 would no longer apply 
when the predicate act is fraud, for governments always have 
some ability to detect and penalize frauds.”), aff’d, 553 U.S. 
639 (2008). 
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methodological differences between DHS’s and the Attorney 
General’s calculations and worry that the calculations will be 
prohibitively involved.  They urge us to stop, as the District 
Court did, before we are “required to adopt complicated rules 
apportioning damages among Plaintiffs removed at different 
levels of injury from the alleged violative acts.”  St. Luke’s 
Health Network, 2019 WL 4393112, at *9.  But this puts the 
cart before the horse.  Whether methodological differences 
between the Auditor General’s and DHS’s analyses of claim 
submissions will even affect damages calculations is a question 
of fact to be resolved at a later stage of litigation.  See In re 
Avandia Mktg., 804 F.3d at 644 (noting that “the issue of [how 
to calculate the precise] damages, rather than demonstrating a 
lack of proximate causation, raises an issue of proof . . . .” 
which is “a question for another day”); see also Anza, 547 U.S. 
at 466–67 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“We did not adopt the 
converse proposition that any injuries that are difficult to 
ascertain must be classified as indirect for purposes of 
determining proximate causation.”). 
 Given that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged proximate 
causation, and because we find no “independent factors that 
account[ed] for [the plaintiffs’] injury . . . and no more 
immediate victim [was] better situated to sue,” we will reverse 
the District Court.  Bridge, 553 U.S. at 658. 
C. Defendants’ Alternative Arguments 
 The bulk of Defendants’ briefing and oral presentation 
is devoted to three additional arguments, which Defendants 
had also raised in their motion to dismiss before the District 
Court: (1) Plaintiffs’ allegations of a RICO predicate are 
implausibly based on inferences from the Auditor General’s 
reports; (2) Plaintiffs’ claims of fraud are not plausible because 
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the discrepancies between DHS’s and the Auditor General’s 
disbursement recommendations are entirely attributable to 
methodological differences; and (3) Plaintiffs lack any basis 
for asserting a cognizable or plausible injury because the EE 
Program funds are non-entitled funds.  Since the District 
Court’s decision to dismiss the civil RICO claim was based 
solely on the issue of proximate causation, we will limit our 
decision to reverse to that ground.  We leave consideration of 
alternative arguments to the District Court upon remand. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Accordingly, we reverse the District Court and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
